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I. Labor Market Institutions and the Regulation of Labor Markets 
 
The Committee recognizes that accomplishment of the purposes of this bill cannot be 
totally achieved without the fullest cooperation of affected employees.  
 
–Senate Report No. 91-1292, 91
st Congress, 2d. Session (October 6, 1970), p. 10. 
 
So concluded members of the Senate in drafting the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.  
Despite the fact that the new Act created an extensive government enforcement system charged 
with improving workplace safety and health, the architects of OSHA recognized the centrality of 
workers to its implementation.  The same might be said for a gamut of federal and state labor 
market regulation from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to the Family Medical Leave Act 
of 1993 to state workers compensation and unemployment benefit systems. 
  As representatives of individual employees, labor market institutions can affect the 
process workplace regulation in two very different ways.  First, they can affect the political 
process in passing legislation and through executive agencies in promulgating regulations—that 
is, the enactment of labor policies.  Second, they can affect the way that those laws and 
regulations are enforced or administered—that is the implementation of laws.   
  There is a significant literature on the role of interest groups in political processes that 
can inform the specific question of what alternative institutions might play the role of “employee 
lobbies” in the enactment of workplace policies.  Although the specific constellation of factors 
that underlie political coalitions around employment issues differ from those underlying other 
public policy issues, the theoretical notions bounding the creation of such coalitions have 
parallels with those in surrounding other areas of policy concern.
1  I therefore do not focus on the 
role for new labor market intermediaries in the realm of policy enactment here.   5 
Implementation of workplace regulations arises either from the enforcement of standards 
created by that legislation or through the administration of programs created by legislation.  For 
example, the federal Davis-Bacon Act that establishes floors for wages in the construction 
industry is implemented by enforcement actions that either directly or through deterrence effects 
indirectly raise the wages paid by construction companies to the “prevailing wage” set for that 
craft in a geographic market.  Workers compensation legislation is implemented via 
administrative activities in two ways: first through the incentive effect provided by experience 
rating of employers covered by the system on safety policies and second by the filing of claims 
by workers injured on the job.   
Implementation--whether through enforcement or administration--raises the question of 
the interaction between institutions created by labor policies to carry out laws and the activities 
of workplace based institutions that directly (e.g. unions) or indirectly (e.g. insurance companies) 
represent the interests of workers.  To examine the need for alternative workplace institutions in 
this area of labor market activity requires one to establish what role institutions—regardless of 
form—play in the first place.  It then requires one to examine the relative abilities of different 
types of institutions to play these roles. 
  This paper argues that there are two distinctive roles required for agents in the 
implementation of workplace policies.  First, the agent must somehow help solve the public 
goods problem inherent in workplace regulation.  Second, the agent must be able to reduce the 
marginal cost of exercising rights conferred to workers that are an important feature of most 
regulatory programs.  One of the major costs in this regard is that of employer discrimination  
arising from exercise of those rights.  Although a variety of institutions may be capable of 
stepping into the fray and serving as agents in the enactment of legislation, the roles required for   6 
implementation are more difficult to embody in a labor market agent.  Laying out the theoretical 
requirements for such agents focuses attention on the features of “emerging labor market 
institutions” most important to the implementation of workplace policies. 
  This chapter begins with a discussion of federal labor regulations in the U.S. and the roles 
they establish for workers through the provision of individually-based worker rights.  It then 
presents a model concerning the decision by workers to exercise those rights.  Based on insights 
from the model, it analyzes the requirements of workplace institutions in fulfilling those roles.  
The third section evaluates a variety of labor market institutions--beginning with labor unions as 
a benchmark—that potentially serve the role as agents.  Based on this evaluation, the paper 
concludes with a discussion of how policies might be adapted to foster agents better able to serve 
the two central roles of labor market intermediaries in implementing labor regulations. 
 
II. Individual Rights and the Need for Collective Agents 
 
IIA. Federal regulations and worker rights 
 
Federal workplace regulations provide employees with important roles directly affecting 
the implementation of those statutes. Much of workplace regulation dating back to Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 and going forward to the Family Medical Leave Act passed 
almost sixty years later provides workers with an opportunity to participate in one or more 
aspects of the regulatory process.   Most important of those rights is that of triggering regulatory 
activity itself.  Although the right to trigger inspections dates back to some of the earliest state-
level labor legislation (Common and Andrews 1936), regulations promulgated during the two 
most recent surges of workplace legislation / executive orders (in 1963-74 and 1986 - 1993) have 
increased the number of regulations providing workers with a right to initiate civil actions under   7 
such laws as Title VII, ADA, PPA, and WARN.  This has resulted in an enormous increase in the 
number of cases filed under employment law, relative to other categories of litigation.
2 
Table 1 depicts a subset of these roles under Federal workplace regulations: the right to 
initiate an agency action and the right to pursue private action in courts either as the first step in 
seeking to change employer behavior or after administrative remedies have been exhausted.  
Most federal legislation also establishes reporting / disclosure requirements that seek to inform 
employees of their rights, employer duties; or employer performance under the statute (these are 
depicted in the final two columns of Table 1).  In addition to these rights, many workplace 
statutes enumerate employee rights regarding participation in various stages of the regulatory 
process, such as by providing workers (or their designated representatives) with a right to 
accompany  government officials during inspections (OSHA, MSHA), and to appeal decisions or 
participate in hearings arising from inspections (OSHA, MSHA, CWHSSA). 
There is little reason to believe that workers uniformly exercise rights granted them under 
labor policies. Studies in several different areas indicate that the propensity to exercise rights 
varies along systematic lines across different groups.  A number of empirical studies have shown 
different propensities for individuals to litigate civil claims (see, for example, Hoyman and 
Stallworth 1981, Shavell 1987).  Other studies have documented factors affecting workers' use of 
grievance procedures in union and nonunion workplaces (Peterson (1992); Feuille and Delaney 
(1992 ); Chachere and Feuille (1993)).  This literature suggests that factors related to the 
individual (sex, education, demographic background), the workplace environment (size, degree 
of conflict, management and union policies), and the specific grievance or civil problem 
involved affect under what circumstances individuals use their rights.  Given the limitations of 
government resources towards enforcement, the conditions under which employees exercise their   8 
rights either to initiate suits or agency action fundamentally affect achievement of policy goals in 
the workplace.  In a somewhat different vein, labor market programs like workers compensation 
and unemployment insurance require that workers initiate the process leading to the issuance of 
benefits provided by those programs. 
 
 
IIB. A Threshold Model of the Exercise of Individual Rights 
 
The degree to which individual employees exercise rights granted them under labor 
regulations can be expected to depend on the perceived benefits versus costs of exercising rights 
from the perspective of an individual worker.   The benefits of exercising a right are a function of 
the impact of labor legislation on the outcome of concern to the worker.  For example, initiating 
an OSHA inspection potentially improves working conditions for the worker by diminishing or 
removing the risk of an injury or illness.  The greater the level of perceived risk faced by the 
worker, the more likely they are to initiate an inspection or otherwise seek to affect redress of the 
problem.  Similarly, the greater the divergence between the wages paid to workers and the wages 
that they are entitled to under the law (e.g. because of premium pay required for overtime), the 
more likely a worker is to exercise rights to initiate actions under the FLSA. 
In order to ascertain the magnitude of these benefits, workers must acquire information 
on the current and legally permissible level of a regulated outcome.  The costs of exercising 
rights are primarily a function of the costs of gathering this information.  These are composed of 
costs associated with:  (a) obtaining information regarding the existence of basic rights as well as 
the standards to which employers are held accountable
3; (b) gathering information on the current 
state of workplace conditions—a particular problem if the risks are complex as in the case of 
safety and health (Viscusi 1983, Viscusi and O'Connor 1984); and (c) learning about the specific   9 
details of how the law is administered (e.g. the procedures to initiate a complaint inspection).  In 
addition to information-related costs, workers face significant costs arising from potential 
employer retaliation (the economic losses associated with retaliatory reassignment or, in the 
extreme, being fired
4) as well as the potential cost of job loss arising from the chance that 
compliance will force a firm to reduce employment in the long run. 
The decision facing a worker on whether or not to exercise a right is represented 
diagrammatically in Figure 1.  The horizontal axis, Xj represents the difference between current 
workplace conditions (e.g. exposure to a health risk; actual wage rate for hours of work) and the 
regulatory standard for that workplace outcome for workplace j. The value of Xj is defined 
where: 
 
Xj < 0: If the current workplace provides conditions above permissible levels (i.e. 
the firm goes beyond compliance required by the standard); 
Xj = 0: If the current workplace provides conditions equal to the required levels 
(i.e. the firm is exactly in compliance with the law); 
Xj > 0: If the current workplace provides conditions below permissible levels (i.e. 
the firm is out compliance). 
 
This means that as Xj increases, a workplace falls further out of compliance with the regulatory 
requirement.  In the case of health and safety regulations, this means that as Xj increases, worker 
exposure to risk increasingly goes beyond the risk levels if workplaces complied with standards; 
for regulations related to compensation like FLSA or Davis-Bacon, this means that actual pay 
increasingly falls below that required under the statute.  For a program like workers 
compensation, increases in Xj imply that the earnings received by the injured worker diverge 
more and more from those he or she is entitled by the program.   10 
Given this definition of Xj, the figure presents two marginal benefit functions.  The lower 
function (MBi) represents the marginal worker i in a workplace j who has the highest individual 
preference for compliance with the regulatory standard.  As such, this function represents the  
worker who will first exercise his or her statutory right in the workplace. I assume that the 
marginal benefit of exercising a right that moves the firm into greater compliance with the 
standard is positive and increasing in Xj.   
Since a violation of a workplace standard typically affects many workers and is often 
associated with violations of other standards that might not directly affect the worker triggering 
the inspection, employee exercise of workplace rights displays positive externalities.    Because 
of this, the marginal benefit for the workplace as a whole is always higher than that of the 
marginal worker for any Xj .The upper marginal benefit function in Figure 1 represents workers 
at the workplace as a whole (MBj), and reflects the vertical aggregation of benefits for all 
affected workers for any given state Xj.
5 
Figure 1 first presents a simple case where the costs of exercising a right are invariant 
across the different levels of Xj and the same for an individual worker as they are for the 
workplace as a whole (the upper line, where MCi = MCj ).  If rights are vested at the individual 
level, worker i will choose to exercise the rights at the state of the workplace Xi
*  where MBi =  
MCi.  Given that the decision is made by the marginal worker with the greatest preference  
workplace conditions consonant with regulatory standards (i.e. the lowest tolerance for current 
conditions being out of compliance), Xi
* represents the level of non-compliance that will trigger 
the exercise of rights for that workplace, when left to the decision of this “threshold” individual 
worker.   11 
Given the public good character of the benefits ensuing from the exercise of rights,  Xi
*  is 
not optimal for the workplace as a whole, because the marginal worker decides only on the basis 
of his or her individual preference.  Accounting for all workers in the workplace, the optimal 
threshold in Figure 1 is Xj
* , where  Xi
*  > Xj
* .  That is, the exercise of right taken at the 
individual level leads to a "higher" threshold (i.e. current conditions being more out of 
compliance with standards) than the threshold that would prevail if the preferences of all workers 
were considered.  Workplace rights therefore will be underutilized because the collective 
benefits arising from their action are not factored into the individual decision.  
If the cost of exercising a right exhibits increasing returns to scale, such as because of 
efficiencies gained from collecting information at the workplace, or multi-workplace level, the 
divergence between threshold for an individual versus collective group of workers grow even 
further.  Protections against discrimination for exercise of rights afforded by a method of 
collectively exercising rights may represent a second reason that the marginal cost of exercise 
may be far lower for a group of workers.  In either case, this situation is depicted in Figure 1 as 
MCj', the lower dotted horizontal line, which is below the marginal cost function faced by an 
individual.  The collective threshold for exercise of rights now occurs at Xj**, arising in an even 
larger gap from the individual threshold for exercising the right, Xi*.    
Thus, the problem arising from the structure of workplace regulations is that if left to the 
individual worker, the threshold for exercise of rights lies above the threshold optimal from the 
workplace—and societal—level.  In order to close this gap, one must surmount the problem of 
(1) aggregating preferences across workers and (2) reducing the marginal cost of exercise of 
those rights. 
   12 
IIC. Workplace Agents and the Exercise of Rights 
A collective workplace agent can potentially solve the problem described above.  It can 
do so first by internalizing the positive externality to workers arising from a claim as a 
representative of all workers in the unit.  A workplace agent can also gather and disseminate 
information thereby lowering the cost of information acquisition faced by individuals.  The 
specific elements required of such an agent are straightforward and flows from the threshold 
model in Figure 1: 
1) Interests allied with workers--specifically an interest in representing the collective 
preferences of workers in regard to working conditions; 
(2) A means of efficiently gathering and disseminating information on rights, 
administrative procedures, and the nature of workplace risks; 
(3) A method of providing protection from employer discrimination against individual 
workers for their exercise of rights.
6 
 
The need for an agent to play these roles points to a conundrum embedded in many workplace 
regulations.  Although many of the policies listed in Table 1 create rights focused on the 
individual worker, exercise of individually-based rights requires an agent operating in the 
collective interest. 
The above discussion also raises a related issue often overlooked in examining workplace 
regulation.  One cannot detach the role of “command and control” regulatory systems from the 
operation of labor market institutions, even where labor market intermediaries are not explicitly 
set out in the legislation as the explicit agent for implementation. It is often assumed that under 
traditional regulatory structures, the government alone acts as the agent of enforcement.  Yet as   13 
the review of labor regulations and the threshold model indicates, implementing  workplace 
policies includes a role for workers and in that way for labor market intermediaries.  The fact that 
an important avenue for enforcement of those laws is the exercise of individual rights belies a 
more complex interaction built into the structure of regulatory systems. 
 
III. Alternative Labor Market Institutions 
 
IIIA. Unions and the Enforcement of Labor Policies 
 
While a number of different arrangements can potentially satisfy the conditions for a 
workplace agent, labor unions potentially fulfill many of them through their basic agency 
functions.
7  Specifically, unions act as purveyors of workplace-based public goods regarding 
labor policies both by internalizing the benefits relating to worker exercise of rights across 
workers in the unit and by lowering the costs of information acquisition. 
As the elected representative of workers, a union has incentives to act on behalf of the 
collective interests of members in the bargaining unit.  This means that a union will not base 
perceptions of the benefit of pursuing a claim under laws based on the preferences of an 
individual worker at the margin, but based on infra-marginal evaluations of those benefits.  In 
facing this allocation problem, a union can vertically aggregate preferences for the "public 
goods" represented by workplace regulations, following the model of public goods seminally 
described in Samuelson (1955).
8 
Unions can efficiently gather and disseminate information on the existence of workplace 
laws and rights created by those laws.  Unions provide this information formally through 
educational programs, in apprenticeship training, or through supplying educational materials.  
Informally, union leaders or staff can alert members of their rights where a problem or issue   14 
arises.  Unions also provide information on the existence of specific underlying problems, 
particularly in the area of safety and health (see Viscusi 1983).  This information may be 
collected and disseminated through formal programs or channels, or informally via the union 
structure or fellow workers. 
Unions also offer individual workers assistance in the actual exercise of their rights.  This 
may result from the operation of committees established under collective bargaining, as is 
common in safety and health or via the help of union staff who can trigger inspections, oversee 
pension fund investments, or assist members file unemployment claims.  Most importantly, 
unions can substantially reduce the costs associated with potential employer discrimination by 
helping affected employees to use anti-discrimination provisions of the labor policies and 
providing this protection via collective bargaining agreements regulating dismissals.  The formal 
protection offered by a collective agreement provides security unavailable in the vast majority of 
nonunion workplaces, even where a grievance procedure exists (Feuille and Delaney 1992). 
Thus, if unions act on behalf of the collective preferences of the workers in the 
bargaining unit, they can be expected to induce greater usage of rights. This sets up a testable 
empirical hypothesis: Government labor market policies should be more fully implemented in 
unionized workplaces than in otherwise comparable nonunion workplaces.   
This hypothesis can be tested by examining empirical studies of labor market regulations 
that have measured union / nonunion differences in implementation. Table 2 summarizes 
evidence of union impacts on both enforcement and compliance under a wide array of labor 
policies. It confirms the predicted presence of systematic differences between union versus 
nonunion enforcement and compliance outcomes across diverse labor regulations and workplace 
policies.  This includes regulations dating back to early labor legislation like the Fair Labor   15 
Standards Act, where unions appreciably raise the probability of compliance with premium pay 
for overtime. Unions also increase an array of enforcement outcomes and compliance with health 
and safety standards under both OSHA and MSHA, as well as provisions of ERISA. Unions also 
raise enforcement and compliance under some of the newest labor policies such as the Worker 
Adjustment and Retraining Act (WARN), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the 
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).  Finally, unions substantially increase the probability that 
workers will receive benefits that they are eligible for under the two major workplace programs 
administered at the state level: unemployment insurance and workers compensation.
9  Thus, with 
the exception of their neutral impact on contract compliance reviews under EO 11246, empirical 
studies of labor market enforcement indicate that unions act as agents that assist employee 
exercise of rights.   
This review suggests that unions seem capable of surmounting the problem of the 
divergence between individual and collective exercise of rights under many different regulatory 
policies.  This provides a useful benchmark to compare other potential agents that might play this 
role in the absence of union presence at the workplace. 
 
How do other labor market intermediaries stack up in solving the problem posed by the 
individual versus collective exercise of rights?  We evaluate six potential intermediaries below, 
each evaluated along the same three dimensions developed in Section II.   The following sections 
do not provide an exhaustive review of these mechanisms, many of which are discussed 
elsewhere in this volume.  The intention instead is to examine each of the alternatives against the 
two dimensions described above and indicate the relative strengths and weaknesses of each.    16 
This provides an analytic backdrop for the other papers that look into some of these mechanisms 
in greater depth. 
 
IIIB. National issue organizations  / Legal service organizations 
Christine Jolls (2000) describes the activities of national issue organizations that deal at 
least in part with employment law (e.g. ACLU; NAACP Legal Defense Fund; National 
Employment Law Project) and legal service organizations (primarily the organizations 
administered by the Legal Services Corporation, created by Congress in 1974) as alternative 
institutions that assist employees exercise their rights. The role of national issue and legal service 
organizations lie either in terms of their impact on the public goods problem or in lowering the 
costs of exercise of rights (including the costs arising from employer discrimination).    
Both types of organizations can act on the public goods aspect of the problem to the 
extent that they can serve as an agent to aggregate preferences for collective actions or lead 
workers to do so. One obvious mechanism for legal organizations to do so is by undertaking 
class action suits on behalf of groups of workers.  Illustrative of this role are several recent cases 
of legal organizations doing so on behalf of agricultural workers and apparel workers in regard to 
violations arising under the FLSA (citation).   
What incentives and capacities do these organizations have to play this role?  The 
evidence presented in Jolls suggests that the nature of funding for the two organizations creates 
incentives that lead both organizations away from the role of solving the workplace public goods 
problem.  National interest organizations tend to focus on fundraising and involvement in high 
profile litigation focused on setting larger legal precedent.  Legal service organizations, in 
contrast, tend to focus on specific cases that arise from individuals coming to those   17 
organizations.  Thus, national interest organizations focus on “high profile, publicly-charged 
issues…[working on] a few influential cases” while legal service organizations “tend to work on 
many routine cases...” (pp. 30-31). 
The different character of the subject matter of legal activities suggests a fundamental 
agency problem in both organizations that undermine them from playing a role analogous to that 
of labor unions in the workplace.  National interest organizations act at least in part as agents of 
their principal sources of funding—private donors and foundations.  Those parties seek to 
maximize their investment (donations / grants) in terms of public impact (or at least perceptions 
of public impact).  This tends to push those organizations away from workplace-level 
interventions and towards cases involving major precedent and public controversy.   
Legal service organizations, in contrast, are agents of their very different funding source, 
the U.S. Congress.  Although Congress cannot be considered a principle with a single utility 
function, Jolls’ evidence is consistent with a story that the long term coalition necessary to 
sustain funding is one where the median Congressional voter seeks to focus those organizations 
on the modest goal of lowering the cost faced by low income individuals in pursuing civil 
claims.  The median Congressional voter however has historically rejected the notion that legal 
services should act as an agent for larger groupings of individuals.
10  In this view, legal service 
organizations might lower the marginal cost of exercise of rights, but only on an ad hoc basis, 
driven by the individual worker decision to approach legal services for assistance in the first 
place. 
     18 
IIIC. Other public interest organization 
There are many other public interest groups that have been organized to deal with the 
workplace issues, with less focus on legal assistance than the organizations studied by Jolls.  
These include “COSH” groups (Committees on Safety and Health) organized in a number of 
states focused on safety and health; disabled workers groups focused on issues of workers 
compensation, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and to a lesser extent OSHA; and groups 
focused on workplace regulations affecting low wage workers in specific industries (e.g. 
“sweatshop” problems in apparel; child labor problems in agriculture or retail).  One activity of 
many of these groups is lobbying and participating in legislative and executive forums at the 
state- and federal-level.  In this capacity, they attempt to affect either the enactment of laws / 
regulations or appropriations towards existing programs, as opposed to the implementation issues 
of central interest here (see Hersch 2000 for discussion of the role of new labor market 
institutions on legislative enactment).  
However, a second set of activities pursued by these groups is direct worker assistance.  
In the 1970s, for example, many COSH groups formed in states to provide information and 
assistance to workers under OSHA.  The intention of many of these groups was to provide 
workers—in particular nonunion workers—with information regarding their rights under the 
newly passed act.  A comparable group was formed for nonunion miners to assist them exercise 
rights under MSHA (McAteer 1985). 
These groups tend to receive their donations from a mix of labor unions (a significant 
source of funding for COSH and disabled worker groups in particular), foundations, and small 
individual workers / donors.  The importance of labor unions as a funding source as well as small 
donors (often those with a personal connection to the issue) tends to lessen the agency problem   19 
discussed in regard to either national interest or legal service organizations.  This potentially 
leads to better alignment between the objectives of the groups and those of the workers they 
intend to assist.
11 
The main difficulty facing these groups is that they operate outside of the workplace, 
although one of their intentions is to help solve the public goods problem that exist within it.  
This limits their potential impact on the exercise of rights primarily to an informational role—
that is towards reducing the marginal costs of exercise of rights.  However, even here their 
impact is modest: Their lack of presence at the work site means that they can have limited impact 
on the threat of discrimination arising from exercise of rights, perhaps the highest cost facing 
workers.  It is noteworthy that COSH groups in many states have concentrated much of their 
efforts over time in their work in conjunction with unions and unionized workplaces, where they 
take advantage of an established agent (comparable to the effects of workplace committees 
described below).
12 
The threshold problem presented by workers compensation and unemployment insurance 
is somewhat different than that posed by OSHA or MSHA.  Here, the public goods aspects of 
providing information and assistance regarding benefits are somewhat less than in regulatory 
programs (that is, the benefits provided by the program look less like public goods).  The 
threshold problem therefore arises more from the difference between the marginal costs of 
disseminating information to workers on a collective versus individual basis.  The potential for 
employer discrimination is also much less for these benefit programs, in part because the their 
financing (and therefore the potential costs to employers) is disconnected from the provision of 
benefits.  As a result, the network of disabled worker organizations can potentially play a more 
fruitful role —outside of the workplace—in providing information on the availability of benefits   20 
and assistance in filing claims.  Although alternative institutions potentially could assist workers 
in the area of unemployment insurance in a comparable way, there is an absence of a large 
network of such organizations in this realm.
13    
 
IIID. Mandated Workplace Committees:  
A number of states mandate that employers establish workplace safety and health 
committees.  Rogers (1995, p. 388) describes the potential role of such mandated committees 
succinctly: 
In principle, a system that lodges responsibility for monitoring compliance with health 
and safety committees, who should be better informed about problems than government 
inspectors, and that gives those committees some authority to address problems should 
enlist the knowledge of regulated actors in findings ways in particular settings of 
satisfying publicly determined standards.  That is does so in a context of declared 
representation rights, moreover, mitigates use of costly litigation. 
 
As suggested by this quote, workplace committees conceivably fulfill the two roles for a 
workplace intermediary for implementing labor policies.  First, by being mandated by the 
government (rather than voluntarily adopted by employers) the committee can serve as an agent 
of employees at the workplace.  In this way, it has an intrinsic interest in vertically aggregating 
preferences for the public goods created by workplace regulations.  Second, a well functioning 
committee can provide information on worker rights, workplace conditions, and administrative 
procedures, thereby lowering MCj.  Finally, a workplace committee might also provide a 
protective shield for individual workers who might be more inclined to report problems before, 
during, or after inspections than they would in the absence of such committees.  As a result, 
mandating committee structures potentially fulfill the major roles described above.   21 
  The primary question in evaluating workplace committees concerns whether mandated 
committees function effectively.  One major concern comes back to the agency problem:  If 
workers view the committee primarily as a creature of the employer, the nature of the agency 
relation between the committee and workers is weakened, and it will be less effective in its 
public goods provision role, as well as in lowering the perceived costs arising from 
discrimination.  A second question concerns its capacities to undertake activities effectively 
(even if it functions independently of the employer).  This will affect its ability to appreciably 
lower the marginal costs of exercising rights. 
  The experience of mandated health and safety committee in the state of Oregon provide 
one indication of the determinants of their effectiveness.  Weil (1999) examines the impact of 
committee mandates on the union effect on OSHA enforcement.  Comparing OSHA inspection 
outcomes for two years preceding and following implementation of committee mandates, he 
finds that mandated committees significantly increase the differential between union and 
nonunion enforcement, arising from considerable strengthening of enforcement activity in union 
workplaces and only modest increases in enforcement in nonunion workplaces.  The only 
exception to this is in the case of large nonunion establishments where committees have more 
appreciable impacts on enforcement activity.   
The results suggest that mandated committees do not represent a simple solution to the 
problem of finding alternative workplace institutions to help implement labor policies.  
Effectiveness in filling the roles laid out in Figure 1 is a function of at least two factors.  First, 
the regulations mandating committees in the first place must allow the establishment of 
independent workplace structures.  Safety and health committee mandates vary enormously in 
terms of their delegated roles, authority, and the methods in which they are established (see   22 
Bernard (1995); Reilly, Paci, and Holl (1995); Rogers (1995); U.S. GAO (1992)).  Second, 
committee effectiveness is related to antecedent conditions in the workplace itself, in particular 
characteristics of workforce that affect committees’ capacity to take on its activities as well as its 
ability to function independently.  In addition to the size of the workplace, factors might include 
worker turnover, skill and education level, and factors affecting informal worker organization.  
 
IIIE. Third Party Monitors 
In recent years, the use of third party monitors as regulatory agents has been discussed as 
a possible solution to limited government enforcement resources.  Proposals for the use of third 
party monitors (such as accounting firms) in the area of safety and health gained public attention 
and became the subject of criticism when it appeared as part of Vice President Al Gore’s 
“Reinventing Government” proposals for the federal sector.   
In more recent years, third party monitors have been used as part of innovative efforts for 
enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act provisions on minimum wage and overtime in the U.S. 
apparel industry.  In particular, the Department of Labor has secured agreement by apparel 
manufacturers to use third parties to monitor aspects of compliance with the FLSA as part of 
larger settlement agreements with the Department.  The role of these monitors is to be able to 
conduct surprise inspections on behalf of the manufacturer among subcontractors used by the 
manufacturer.  The results of the inspections can be used by the manufacturer to monitor cases 
where non-compliant contractors are violating the Act, thereby exposing the manufacturer to 
civil penalties and more importantly supply disruptions (U.S. Department of Labor 1999). 
Monitors can either be drawn from the private sector (accounting firms; for-profit 
enterprises specifically created for this function) or the not-for-profit sector (that is, independent   23 
organizations that created to act as workplace monitors).  In the case of monitors created under 
“Compliance Program Agreements” between the U.S. Department of Labor and apparel 
manufacturers, their structure, funding, and activities are negotiable, although the Labor 
Department has “model provisions” that it encourages manufacturers to adopt (U.S. Department 
of Labor 1998).   
The agency relations of third party monitors are complex in that—at least on paper--they 
act as agents of government.  However, in reality they are agents of other private parties who 
have an interest in allowing them to take on certain quasi-governmental activity.  In the area of 
apparel, third party monitors are usually the agents of manufacturers who use them to monitor 
their subcontractors in terms of compliance with minimum wage and overtime laws required by 
FLSA.  Manufacturers have the incentive to agree to use such outside monitors to ensure that 
their sewing contractors comply with labor standards because of concern that noncompliance 
with laws can lead their goods to be embargoed by the Department of Labor.  Resulting delays in 
shipments to retailers can have costly consequences to the manufacturer (Weil 2000).  As a 
result, the interests of third party monitors, though agents of the manufacturer, are also aligned to 
some extent with those of the government.
14    
Third party monitors, then, may help deal with the threshold gap depicted in Figure 1 
more in their capacity to supplement the enforcement activities of the Department of Labor, than 
in their potential role as an institutional agent for workers.   Although the presence of a third 
party monitor raises the probability that a given workplace will be inspected, and that workers 
might have an opportunity to report problems, the threshold problem is much the same as under 
the traditional regulatory system. Monitors may, however, lower the marginal cost associated 
with worker exercise of rights, particularly if they provide a “shield” against discrimination if   24 
workers bring labor standards violations to their attention.  The degree to which they play this 
role has in large part to do with the specific monitoring protocols negotiated between 
manufacturers, monitors, and the government.  Examining how different types of protocols affect 
the exercise of rights and implementation of regulations presents an important area for future 
study. 
 
IIIF. Alternative dispute resolution systems 
On the surface, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems may not seem to fit the 
description of an emerging labor market institution, in that ADR describes a process of resolving 
disputes arising under workplace regulation rather than being a workplace entity per se.  ADR 
has been used in a variety of forums, but is discussed here in its specific use as a means for 
resolving employment disputes arising under labor statutes through mediation, arbitration, or 
some combination of the two (for an overview of the use of ADR in this capacity and others, see 
Dunlop and Zack 1997, 2001). 
Under ADR, an employee seeks recourse to a problem such as discrimination via an 
internal mediation / arbitration procedure rather than through the relevant agency or via the 
courts.  Because these procedures are administered within the company and rely, at least at initial 
stages, on mediation, disputes can in theory be resolved more rapidly.   
Two major Supreme Court decisions, the Gilmer decision of 1991 and the Circuit City in 
2001 raise the stakes of ADR as a means of resolving such claims.
15  Both Gilmer and Circuit 
City extend the Federal Arbitration Act from its historic focus on commercial disputes to those 
involving employment contracts.  Specifically, they support the right of an employer to require 
employees to sign pre-hire agreements compelling them to use company-sponsored dispute   25 
resolution (usually arbitration) for statutory disputes rather than using the administrative 
channels established in the legislation (as described in Table 1).  In effect, employees forgo their 
right to pursue such claims through administrative channels as a condition of employment.   
Not surprisingly, the Gilmer and Circuit City decisions are controversial, most notably 
because of doubts that employees will receive a fair hearing in company-sponsored arbitration 
systems.  In fact, many companies in the immediate wake of Gilmer adopted arbitration 
procedures that were decidedly tilted towards the employer in that companies unilaterally chose 
the arbitrator, established rules of the procedure (including barring formal depositions or even 
written records of the arbitration), and held the right to unilaterally change those procedures.  In 
response to the employer bias of many post-Gilmer ADR systems, a number of the institutions 
drawn upon by companies to serve in arbitration proceedings (including the American 
Association of Arbitrators and the American Bar Associations) created a “Due Process Protocol” 
which establishes that signatory associations and their members will only serve as arbitrators in 
systems that adhere to basic conditions of procedural fairness.
16    
Even assuming that the “Due Process Protocol” assures a modicum of fairness in such 
proceedings in nonunion workplaces, does establishing internal procedures for mediation and / or 
arbitration of statutory disputes provide a solution to the rights problem portrayed in Figure 1?   
On one hand, ADR can be seen as a means of lowering the marginal cost of exercise of rights in 
that it makes (potentially) the cost for the disputant lower than under the traditional system 
where workers must press their own claims under various federal labor statutes.  By lowering the 
costs of exercise, the gap depicted in Figure 1 narrows.   
On the other hand, the use of ADR by parties in nonunion workplaces still presupposes 
that an employee comes forward with a claim.  Yet the existence of an internal procedure (and   26 
the requirement to use that system via pre-hire agreement) does not inherently create an agent for 
those employees.
17  The fact that the procedure is governed by the employer rather than a third 
party (i.e. the government) may further dampen the extent to which workers collectively might 
pursue a claim involving more widespread violations of a statutory right.   
As a result, ADR may be most beneficial in those cases where the divergence between 
individual and workplace marginal benefits is relatively small, such as in resolving disputes 
arising under workers compensation or very specific claims under statutes like FLSA or ERISA.  
But in most areas of workplace regulation—particularly regarding workplace discrimination that 
has motivated many nonunion companies to adopt internal arbitration systems
18—ADR does not 
provide a solution to the public goods problem.  It remains to be seen if the growth of ADR 
potentially fueled by the Circuit City decision will induce existing institutions (e.g. labor unions, 
workers’ rights groups, law firms) to serve a new role as third party representatives within 
nonunion firms.  
 
IV. Concluding Thoughts and Implications 
It is easy for politicians, or reformers, or trade union officials to boast of the laws which 
they have secured for labor, and it is just as easy to overlook the details, or 
appropriations, or competent officials that are needed to make them enforceable.  
(Commons and Andrews 1936, p. 448). 
 
Can emerging labor market institutions play the role of collective agent in a workplace 
that draws heavily upon the exercise of individual rights for implementation?  Are there 
emerging labor market institutions that plausibly can take up this role where labor unions are not 
present?     27 
Table 3 summarizes the analysis of the ability of alternative workplace institutions 
surveyed above to do so. An implication of the foregoing analysis is that it may be difficult for a 
single institution to play the varied roles required of a collective agent across a range of 
workplace regulations.  In particular, absent a labor union, it is difficult to devise an institutional 
arrangement that effectively aligns its interests with those of the workforce and at the same time 
has the kind of access to the workplace necessary to act upon those interests.  Nonetheless, Table 
3 suggests that a mixed approach, incorporating different institutions for different areas of 
regulation might help to close the gap arising in implementation of workplace regulations.  Posed 
in this way, the policy question shifts from a focus on the agent per se and to the functions that 
must be performed to assure that the objectives of workplace regulations are achieved. 
For example, one set of policy options revolves around reducing the marginal cost of exercise of 
rights.  This might include finding new means of making workers aware of their statutory rights 
or reducing the perceived cost of exercise by improving protections against employer 
discrimination (e.g. administrative procedures that protect employees’ identity in the case of 
triggering inspections).  Recent efforts by OSHA to create an extensive “workers’ page” on their 
web site provides one example of interventions of this type.  The page includes instructions on 
filing a complaint with OSHA (including downloadable complaint forms), information about 
statutory coverage, employee rights, and health and safety standards.
19 
Another range of policy options involves creating incentives to foster new workplace 
institutions that might provide some of the core functions of a collective agent.  One approach 
would be to restructure aspects of regulatory systems to create incentives on the regulated parties 
themselves to fashion agents (such as private monitors) that provide at least some of the 
functions of collective agents.  One example of this type of policy described above is the U.S.   28 
Department of Labor “No Sweat” enforcement strategy that induces manufacturers to create third 
party monitors to oversee the activities of subcontractors.  
Alternatively, public policies might assist existing labor market institutions sharpen their 
abilities to undertake the central aspects as collective agents. Policy proposals in this vein 
include improving the access that public interest groups and other institutions have to employees 
at workplaces thereby enhancing their potential role as third party representatives in ADR 
systems.  By improving employee access to potential outside representation, ADR systems 
(which will undoubtedly become even more prevalent in the wake of the Circuit City decision) 
will be better prepared to deal with systemic workplace problems.  Developing a more robust set 
of institutions capable of representing nonunion workers in such company-based mediation and 
arbitration procedures may prove an important new means of improving the exercise of 
individual rights in nonunion workplaces.   
Commons and Andrews recognized at the dawn of the modern era of workplace 
regulation that enactment of labor regulations did not assure implementation.  Along with 
guaranteeing that the agencies vested with enforcement or administrative authority receive 
adequate appropriations and are staffed with competent personnel, this essay underscores the 
need to develop complementary institutions in the labor market to assure full implementation.  
Creating and fostering the institutions capable of taking on these functions may prove to be one 
of the most challenging aspects of regulating the labor market in the 21
st Century.    29 
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Table 1: Employee Rights and Reporting Requirements under Federal Workplace Regulations 
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ADA  ￿  ￿  ￿    ￿  ￿  ￿ 
 






































































































































































































    a Full names of statutes, date of passage, and brief description provided in Appendix Table A1.   39 
TABLE 2: Impact of Labor Unions on Enforcement and Compliance with Workplace Regulations 
 
 




Union Impact on Enforcement 
 





Fair Labor Standards Act—
Overtime Provisions 
 
Inclusion of premium pay for overtime standard 
in collective agreements  
 




   BNA (1997) 
Compliance: 
   Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982); 




Raise degree of scrutiny over eligible pension 
plans 
 
Require more strict adherence to 
eligibility and financial management 
standards by employers 
 
Enforcement:  






Higher inspection probabilities; longer 
inspections; shorter abatement duration; and 
higher penalties 
 




  Weil (1991, 1992) 
Compliance: 




Higher inspection probabilities; longer / more 









No impact on probability of receiving a federal 








Increase in the probability of filing suit under 
WARN 
 
No impact on the probability of providing 
advance notice to affected workers 
 
Enforcement: 
   GAO (1993); 
   Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1990) 
Compliance: 
  Addison and Blackburn (1994) 
ADA  N/A  Raise probability that firms comply with 
four core practices required by ADA 
Stern and Balser (1996) 
FMLA  Improve information to workers regarding 
rights and eligibility under FMLA 
Increase probability that leave was fully 
paid by employer as provided 






Increase probability of filings for benefits 
among eligible workers and benefit levels 
for given disability level. 
Butler and Worrall (1983) 








Increase in the probability of filing for 
benefits among eligible workers 
 
Blank and Card (1991) 
Budd and McCall (1997)  






















Labor unions (Benchmark) 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  See table 2 for 
empirical results 
National issue organizations   No  No  No  Agency problems 
limit role to 
precedent setting 
cases  
Legal service organizations  No  Partially  No 
 
Agency problems 




Other public interest 
organizations (e.g. COSH / 
Disabled workers advocacy 
organizations) 








Yes / No  Yes  Yes / No  Effectiveness is 
function of nature 
of the mandate 
and antecedent 




Third party monitors (e.g. 
FLSA) 
?  Yes  Partially  Monitors’ agency 
relationship with 
third party and 
government 




Alternative Dispute Resolution 
systems 
No  Yes  ?  Most effective 
where divergence 
of private and 
workplace 
benefits from 
exercise of rights 
is small.  
Figure 1 
Threshold Model of Employee Exercise of Rights 
 
Benefit / Cost from Exercising Statutory Right







Xj**Table A1: Major Federal Workplace Regulations 
 









Labor Standards       
 














Provides for payment of prevailing local wages and benefits to workers employed by contractors and subcontractors on 
federal contracts for construction, alteration, repair, painting or decorating of public buildings or public works 
 






Provides for payment of prevailing local wages and fringe benefits and safety & health standards for employees of 








Provides for labor standards including wage and hour, for employees working on federal contracts for the manufacturing or 
furnishing of materials, supplies, articles, or equipment 
 







Establishes standards for hours, overtime compensation, and safety for employees working on federal and federally funded 
contracts and subcontracts 
 
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 






Protects migrant and seasonal agricultural workers in their dealings with farm labor contractors, agricultural employers, 
associations, and providers of migrant housing 
Benefits 
 







Establishes uniform standards for employee pension and welfare benefit plans, including minimum participation, accrual and 
vesting requirements, fiduciary responsibilities, reporting and disclosure 
 







Provides for continued health care coverage under group health plans for qualified separated workers for up to 18 months 
 
Unemployment Compensation provision 





Authorizes funding for state unemployment compensation administrations and provides the general framework for the 
operation of state unemployment insurance programs 
 





Entitles employees to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave each for specified family and medical reasons such 
as the birth or adoption of a child or an illness in the family 
Civil Rights 




Prohibits employment or membership discrimination by employers, employment agencies, and unions on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; prohibits discrimination in employment against women affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical condition 
 






Prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in the payment of wages 
 






Prohibits discrimination against an employee or applicant for employment by federal contractors, and requires federal 
contractors to take affirmative action to ensure that employees and applicants for employment are treated without bias.    43 
 






Prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age against persons 40 years and older 
 






Prohibits employment discrimination against individuals with disabilities; requires employer to make "reasonable 
accommodations" for disabilities unless doing so would cause undue hardship to the employer 
 






Prohibits federal contractors and subcontractors from discriminating in employment on the basis of disability and requires 
them to take affirmative action to employ, and advance in employment, individuals with disabilities 
 
Anti-retaliatory provision-Surface 






Prohibits the discharge or discriminatory action against employees for filing complaints relating to a violation of a 
commercial motor vehicle safety rule or regulation or for refusing to operate a vehicle in violation of federal rules, or 
because of a fear of serious injury due to an unsafe condition 
 
Occupational Health & Safety 
 






Requires employers to furnish each employee with work and a workplace free from recognized hazards that can cause death 
or serious physical harm 
 






Requires mine operators to comply with health and safety standards and requirements established to protect miners 
 
















Protects certain rights of workers including the right to organize and bargain collectively through representation of their own 
choice 
 







Requires the reporting and disclosure of certain financial and administrative practices of labor organizations and employers; 
establishes certain rights for members and imposes other requirements on labor organizations 
 






Sets out the rights and responsibilities of management and workers in the rail and airline industries and provides for 
negotiation and mediation procedures to settle labor-management disputes 
 
Hiring & Separation Decisions 
 






Prohibits the use of lie detectors for pre-employment screening or use during the course of employment 
 






Provides reemployment rights for persons returning from active duty, reserve training, or National Guard duty 
 







Prohibits the hiring of illegal aliens and imposes certain duties on employers; protects employment rights of legal aliens; 
authorizes but limits the use of imported temporary agricultural workers 
 






Requires employers to provide 60 days advance written notice of a layoff to individual affected employees, local 
governments, and other parties 
SOURCE: Adapted from GAO (1994), Table 2.1; Figures 2.1.   45 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 For example, Stigler (1974) explains the significant influence of certain small interest 
groups arises from their ability to surmount the free rider problem among supporters as a 
result of their potentially high payoff from political action and the ability of members of 
the coalition to sanction non-participants.  In this view, an employment lobby 
representing individual workers faces a far greater problem of funding its political 
activities because of the more diffuse benefits conferred to individual workers arising 
from supporting the lobby’s agenda and the difficulty of denying benefits or instituting 
sanctions because of non-participation.  Unions address this free rider problem by 
allocating a portion of dues revenues to political activities directed towards workplace 
issues (see Masters 1997 for a recent discussion).  Whether other institutions can play a 
comparable role is discussed in Hersch (2000). 
2 This can be seen in the relative growth in five categories of employment related 
lawsuits filed in federal district courts between 1971 and 1991.  The fastest growing 
category in relative terms over the period has been litigation on employment law, which 
went in absolute terms from 4,331 cases filed in 1971 to 22,968 cases in 1991.  As a 
result, employment law went from comprising about 6% of the 69,465 civil cases filed in 
federal district courts in 1971 to about 16% of the 146,790 civil cases filed in 1991.  
These figures are reported in Commission on the Future of Worker-Management 
Relations (1994), Exhibit IV-3, p. 134. 
3This is a recurring problem under workplace regulation.   For example, a survey of 
OSHA compliance officers by the GAO concluded that "...many OSHA inspectors 
believe workers' participation [in OSHA] is limited by their lack of knowledge about   46 
                                                                                                                                                 
their rights and lack of protection from employer reprisal" (U.S. GAO 1989).  The 
decline in the “take up” rate for unemployment insurance has been partly ascribed to the 
lack of information to workers about their access to unemployment benefits (Wandner 
and Stettner 2000).  Freeman and Rogers (1999, Chapter 6) also present survey evidence 
indicating pervasive worker misperceptions regarding their rights under employment and 
labor laws. 
4 The costs of retaliation may be even more severe, such as in the well-known 1996 case 
of apparel workers in El Monte, Ca, held in virtual captivity by their employer who used 
physical intimidation to prevent the workers from leaving. 
5 The degree to which MBi diverges from MBj will differ across workplace regulations.  
For example, there are greater divergences between the functions for regulations like 
OSHA, FLSA, or policies dealing with discrimination where the risks or problems faced 
by one worker will likely be more pervasive and therefore affect many other workers as 
well.  In contrast, under benefit programs like workers compensation or unemployment, 
the spill-overs are likely much smaller since the program primarily confers benefits to the 
worker directly affected.  The implications of these differences are discussed in Section 
III. 
6 Strictly speaking, this third condition is really an aspect of the second condition.  
Discrimination for use of a right represents a cost to a worker arising from discipline or 
discharge. 
7 Williamson (1985: 254) points out, "(u)nions can both serve as a source of information 
regarding employee needs and preferences..."  In addition to Williamson, the role of   47 
                                                                                                                                                 
unions in providing basic agency functions is discussed in Freeman and Medoff (1984), 
particularly in regard to personnel practices and benefits. 
8 There might also be divergences in behavior arising from a number of sources.  Median 
voter models of union behavior would predict that union leadership would tend to pursue 
policies reflective of more senior members of the unit which might not be synonymous 
with the public goods solution to benefit valuation.  Alternatively, principal / agent 
divergences in interest may also lead away from optimal behaviors from the perspective 
of collective worker interests.  For example, the union may have incentives to "overuse" 
certain rights for strategic reasons unrelated to the workplace regulation, for example as a 
source of pressure in collective bargaining or strikes (U.S. GAO 2000).    However, 
principal / agent divergences in behavior may be moderated both through electoral 
processes and by worker recourse via duty of fair representation claims which tend to 
induce unions to pursue activities consonant with the preferences of represented workers. 
9 This latter effect of unions as workplace agents is particularly important given the long 
term decline in benefit recipiency under these programs (Wandner and Stettner 2000). 
10 Jolls cites a number of examples of Congress curtailing class action activity by legal 
service attorneys.  The median voter hypothesis advanced here could be more rigorously 
tested by examining changes in legal service activities over time given shifts in political 
coalitions in Congress over time. 
11 This is not to argue that the alignment between these organizations and workers is as 
close as found in the case of labor unions.  For example, donors to COSH or disabled 
worker groups may be similarly interested in “large impacts” as those funding national 
interest organizations which may skew institutional activities in a similar manner.  The   48 
                                                                                                                                                 
importance of union funds may also lead these organizations to direct their resources 
towards certain nonunion workplaces of strategic interest to unions.  Even more, union 
funding could lead COSH groups to devote their resources supplementing the activities of 
unions in already organized workplaces.  There is some evidence of the latter behavior, as 
described below. 
12 Indicative of this is the history of “New Directions” grants provided by OSHA in the 
1970s and 1980s that provided financial assistance for promotion of private health and 
safety programs.  The majority of these grants went either to unions or to joint COSH / 
union initiatives. 
13 Differences in the presence of worker groups to assist disabled workers versus 
unemployed workers once again raises the economics of interest group formation 
discussed by Stigler and others.  The longevity of the effects of workplace disability as 
opposed to the transient nature of unemployment creates greater incentives for the 
formation of sustainable organizations concerning the former issue, and the difficulty of 
sustaining organizations (particularly over the course of business cycles) in the latter 
area.  Thus, to the extent that workers groups have formed over the latter issue, they have 
been linked to industries facing periods of intense crisis (e.g. steel) or deep recessions.  
After crises pass (or industry restructuring occurs and workers find other employment) 
these groups tend to disband. See Hoerr (1988) for a discussion of these types of 
assistance groups in the steel industry.  
14 Where monitoring has been adopted out of strictly voluntary agreements and lacking 
the “teeth” of government sanctions like the right to embargo goods, the identification of 
third party monitors with regulatory objectives will be far weaker.  This raises one of the   49 
                                                                                                                                                 
limitations of using third party monitors in the international arena to police labor 
standards, where there is no comparable government authority underlying the 
agreements.  Third party monitors in the international labor standards arena are discussed 
in Elliot and Freeman (2000). 
15 Gilmer v. Interstate / Johnson Lane Corp. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991); Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams. 532 S. Ct ____ (2001). 
16 Among those conditions, the Protocol specifies that the arbitration system provide 
employees with a right to representation in proceedings, and a right to participate in the 
selection of an arbitrator / mediator drawn from “…a demographically diverse panel of 
trained mediators and arbitrators…” (Dunlop and Zack, 2001, p. 6).  The Due Process 
Protocol has been adopted by a wide variety of institutions drawn on by companies for 
arbitration. 
17 Note that this argument also supports the use of ADR in cases where some form of 
worker representative is already present, such as in unionized workplaces.  Here, ADR 
can lead to more speedy and cost effective resolution of statutory disputes at the same 
time that workers’ interests are protected through third party representation. 
18 The Gilmer case involved a case of age discrimination; Circuit City involved 
discrimination because of sexual preference. 
19 The “Workers’ Page” can be found at http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/worker/index.html. 